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Inflation Stabilization and Capital Mobility
ABSTRACT
The paper investigates the process of inflation stabilization under
conditions of international capital mobility. A first part looks at
the traditional view of inflation and payments problems as a reflection of
fiscal problems and deficit finance. From there the analysis proceeds to
the macro—dynamics of inflation stabilization under alternative polciy regimes.
Inflation stabilization is studied in an open economy model of inflation
and output determination with high but imperfect capital mobility. The policy
regimes considered range from a monetary growth rule combined with constant
real exchange rates to a prefixed path for the nominal exchange rate com-
bined with active money for external balance.
The analysis identifies three main problems in the stabilization effort.
First and foremost, the problems of stubborn inflation. Because inflation
does not collapse in the face of good intentions inflation stabilization
requires a protracted reduction in the level of demand. The inflation
process is modelled along two different lines, each emphasizing inertia.
Second, the velocity problem which arises from the fact that a reduction in
inflation and nominal interest rates raises real demand. This implies that
in the adjustment process Inflation has to average less than money growth and,
indeed, has to fall transitorily below the new rate of money creation. Third,
the real exchange rate problem. This arises from the fact inflation stabili-
zation reduces output and raises real interest rates, thus improving the
balance of payments, creating a sterilization problem and/or putting upward
pressure on the exchange rate. An initial real appreciation might be welcome
as it provides help in the disinflation process, but it must be recognized that
the benefit is transitory and must ultimately be repaid when the real exchange
rate, with adverse inflation effects, returns to its equilibrium level.
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The prthl of stabilisation policy in high-infla-
tion cxx]ntries has, over the last ten years, undergone a substantial
develojirent. The traditional view takes stabilisation policy to be
prirrarily a fiscal issue. Wnile recognizing, and indeed errhasizing,
that stabilisatiari involves a cut in the standard of living, this
view attaches no grat transition costs to stabilisation. It hardly
perceives stabilisation as a rracroecx)ncrnc issue. The view is even
carried to the point of arguing that disinflation has been rrade to
lock nore painful than the historical record will bear
The new elarnants in thinking about inflation stabi-
lisation in high—inflation countries, whether they be industrialized
or semi-industrialized, include the follcwing: First, although fiscal
policy certainly sets the trend rate of inflation when there is defi-
cit finance, inflation may be quite independent of the budget in the
shortrun and enjoy a life of its own. Second, reinforcing the first
cbservation, stabilisation encounters the serious obstacle of inflation
inertia. Inflation, other things equal, is what it was and fiscal sta-
bilisation, or expectations thereof, will not lead to a collapse of
the prevailing rate of inflation. Third, iranaged real appreciation
1See A.Harberger "The Inflation Syedrare" in J.Flanders and A.Raziri (eds.)
Inflation in Develcing Countries,AcademiC Press, 1980.o e e:cha4-ge te ray prove a tetfrig tool in the blti
prcces. Fourth, capital flcs, rospensive to incornational interest
thffercntials, nay bc at various stages of the cycle an aide and
a bj.en to the stabjijsatjon effort. Fifth, ex:tations prove sth—
stantially rore ircxrtant in the capital account of the balance of pay
iunts than in the lahor carket. Sixth, there exiss a pessihiait' that
icnetary restriction induces, in me ahortrun, öfladverseeffect cc.
inflation.
The first part of this paper sketches a sirpie version
or the traditional rodel and drs the principal lesscns. The clisccuss—
ion is follo.'ed by two points of aualificat.ion. Cce concerns the c:vos-
tion fnether the system is overdete-rnined —essentiallythe structura—
list vi of fiscal oclicy. The other concerns the esticn of terms
of trade shc:s and inflation. In the second pert, the stbiUsetion
pr±lern is acoroathed frai the perspective of acrcecormhc cyarrics.
flrphasis is placed there on the inertia of the inflation process and
on the interaction between stabilisation rules for rroney, interest rates,
and exchanQe rates and the resulting paths for output, real exchange ra-
tes and the balance of arents.I. IN TIa ,FISCAL POLICY ANDTEPJ'SOF TDE sioc:<s
1.F1SCalPoliarjdInflation
Afirst model of the open economy focusses on
the goods market and the current account. Two key variables
are highlighted: the real exchange rate eEP*/Pand the
budget deficit ratio 0,expressedas a fraction of GDP.
In the goods market fullerrployrrent equilihruin
obtains when the demand for home output, determined by the
deficit ratio and the real exchange rate, equals the avail
able supply,y
(1) y =J(e,)
InFigure 1 we show the goods market equilibrium schedule II
along which internal balance prevails. The schedule is
negatively sloped since a real depreciation raisesdemand
for home output sc that for fullemploymentwe require an
offsetting c3eflauonary cut in the budget. Points above the
schedule correspond to overemployrnent and points belowto
unemployment.
Along FF the current balance is in equilibrium.
A real depreciation improves the currentbalance (given
elasticity conditions) .Tomaintain externalbalance a
real depreciation must be offset by a demandexpansion
through an increased budget deficit.The budget deficit is financed by money crea-
tion or by the "inflation tax". With the demand for real
balances, x, a function of the rateof inflation,p, the
budget financing implies:
(2) x() =
Withan inflation elasticity of less than unity the equation
implies that an increased deficit ratio calls for a higher
inflation rate to finance the budget. This relation is shown
in thelowereanel of Ficrre 1.
Eauilibrium obtains at point A wherethe
economyisfully employed witha balanced currentaccount
ora current account financed byexogenousflowsoflending,
directinvestment and aid. Corresuonding to the equilibrium
of the real economy is an inflation rate
What precepts does this mOdel yield? Themodel
has three implications:
i.inflationis a purely fiscal phenomenon
ii.tiade problems reruire for their cure botha real
depreciation and fiscal. restraint.
iii.Withtrend inflation, as an implication of the fiscal
situation, the appropriate exchange policy is to
have mini—devaluations that stabilize the realex-
change rate.
Suppose past policies had moved the economy to
a position of fullemployment with an external deficit at







C-cdeficit and hence absorption and to generate an increase in
net exports through a real depreciation. This would restore
internaland external balance at point A. The policy mix
would also lead to a reduction in the rate inflation. In
particular with a highly nonlinear inflation—budgetrela-
tion the gain in terms of reduced inflationmay prove
substantial,particularly so if the gover:urent collects
onlya nir::rfraction of the seiqnorage.1
2.TheOverdetermjnedS\s-em
Afirst complication to the program of sta-
bilisation is the recognition of further constraints. The
model is nc only one ofinternal and external balance and of
budget finaoe, italsoincludes cc'nstreinon policiesimpos
ed by social relations. These maytakeanyof avariety of
forms: rigid real waces and hence a constraint on the real
exchange ra-e, a distribution Of income, or a relationbe—
tween the realexchangerate and the budget. Abroad
characterisjon of these constrainse is shcwr. inFigure1
as the scheiule cc.Theschedule suggests that a real
depreciatic-,because itlowers the standard of living, must
be offset by an increased budget deficit that provides a real
income suonThnent to somesector:food subsidies, credit
subsidies, etc.
1See R.A.undell,I.bnetaTh, CcKyearPinlishing Co.,1971, S.Fiscner,
"SeigTiorage arid the Case for a National Mnriey",assachusetts Institute of
Technolcy,l9E:arid R.Dor±eisch,"Iriflation, Capital and Deficit Finance."
uouiTalofCrethtaridEar1ng ,Fehr.iary1976.It is aoparent that the further constraint
nkes it impossible, except by good fortune, to attain
internal and external balance. Typically the real exchange
rate consistent with full balance leaves the public with a
standard of living below the level acceptable and hence there
is pressure to fiscalize the aspirations by moving to a
deficit point such as A", ith occasional return to eXternal
balance whenever external financing crises ce to dominate.
It is apparent that under these conditions
stabilisation policy is not only a technical issue of restor
ing the right real exd-arge rate and stopping deficit finance.
More likely some structural policies such astariffs or
employment subsidies are required to help reconcile the
overdeterrnjried system.C.
3.Terms of Trade Shocks and Inflation
The inflation stabilisation problem is frequently
rendered more difficult, and indeed obscured, by the presence of
high underlying inflation combined with terms of trade shocks.
Thesecomplications make it essential to introduce the distinc-
tion between services and manufacturs where wage-priceforma-
tionis I*macroeconomicu and (beef, coffee,oil) the
prices of which are susceptible f shochs .naesin the world
pricesof commodity exports or imports, reiati\Te to those of
manufactures, exert important effects on the inflationprocess
throughseveral channels:
i. Direct input cost effects.
ii.Tothe extentthat the commodities arewage goods the
requiredreal wage in terms of manufactures rises.
With home manufactures priced by a mark—up onwages
this implies a pressure for a real appreciation to
compensate for the loss of real income in terms of
commodities byincreasedpurchasing po:er interms of
manufactures mport.s.This is, of cours, a real wage
resistanceargument. It is particular forceful when
the price shock occurs in commodity exports since in
thatevent the economy can actually afford, from a
current account point of view, the real appreciation.
Of course, for manufactures it represents a loss in
competitiveness.
iii. Closely related to the preceding argument, changes in
commodity prices, in the presence of stickyrelativesectcra1 wages, can lead to a rise of wages in industry.
Agair. with mark—up pricing inflation and real apprecia
tion will result.
iv. Chances in the real price of commodities affect real
iricce and hence aggregate demandfor industrial output.
Arising real price of conrnodityexportsleads to real
appreciationfor manufactures and conversely for an
increasein real corrodity import price.
In the remainder of this paper I will abstract from
these ccinodity inflation issues. They are introduced here mainly
because in recent history they may have been an important aspect
of the stabilisation problem.1
1SeeBao Central delaRepublica Argentina AnticioiO Meiria Anua11979,
Mercad.o (Argentir) January 10,1980 pp.20-27 and,for theoretical issues:
W.Bu.iter"Shortrun nd Lonrur. Effects of External DisturbancesUner a
Floating Exchan Rate",Econc1ric-,45,l978,E.CarGOSO"Oferta de Alirrentos C
Infiaçc",P:LsaePle eaer.th,lO,l98Oand R.Flcxxl and N.Peregrirr. Narion,
"The Tran.srrissien of Disturbances UncerAlternatveExchange Rate Regires
WithOttiira1Inexing." ,National Eureau of Econaric Research,1980.flJ DYNAMiCS OF INFLATION STJ\ESILISATION
Inthis part we investigate the dynamicsof inflation stabilisa—
tion.;e start with a brief discussion of ourmacroecnrnjcmodel
andthensketchalternativepolicy arrangements. After identify—
ing three key Droblems in the stabilisation effort ;e discuss
the adjustment process under alternative rules.
1. The Model
Weconsider an economy that producesand exports a
single commodity,facinga downward sloping demand curve in the
world market. Demand for domestic output ddson ncm, e
relative price of competing importables in terms of domestic
goods,,andof the real rate interest, r.Output, y, is
demand determined. Ecuilibrium in the home gos market requires
the ecuality of output and demand,orin reduced fo]I1:1
(3) y ae br
Noretarv ecuilibrium,inohs mannerof the standard LM
curve, determines theinterest rate, i,as a function of real
balances and real income:
(4) i=cy—dx
where x denotes the lo: of real balances, x=m—p with m and p
1
Hereand e are the logs of output and the real exchange rate. Furthermore
by choice of units y can be interpreted as the deviation of output from the
fulleoployrnent level y =0.the logs of nominal morey and prices.
The balance of payments depends, via the currentaccount,
onreal income and the real exchange rate and,
via the capital account, on the interr1ational interest
differential adjusted for anticipated depreciation,
B =fé—gy+h(ie)
Noting the definition of the real exchange rate, =
wecan rewrite the capital account as a function of the real in
terest rate, r =i-pand the real depreciation rate, é =e-p:
(z) B=f6—gy+h(r—6)
In defining the capital account of the balance of payments we
have, already, imposed the perfect foresight assumption in that
we identify expected inflation and depreciation with the actual
rates.
The rnoae is as yet incomplete in tnat neither the :n-
flation process :p.or the monetary and exchange rate policies have
been specified. Even so we can look at equilibrii of the gocds irar-
:Ktandthe balance of payments, to gain some understanding of
the real interest rate—real exchange rate relations. In Figure 2
we plot as the II schedule the combinations of real interest rates
real exchangerates
and 'ompatible with fullemployrnent internal balance. Higher real
Note that for simplicity the foreign nominal interest rate is set equal to
zero. With e the nominal e>:change rate; e represents the rate of deprecia
tion and i—è the interest differential in favor of the home country.interest rates reduce demand and thus must be compensated bya
realdepriation that shifts demand toward domestic goods.Her:a
II is upward sloping.
The schedule FF shows external balance.The schedule
is drawn for a zero rate of real depreciation.A higher level of
the real exchange rate (a real depreciation) improves the current
account and thus must be offset by a capital account deteriora-
tion due to lower real interest rates.' ThusFF is negatively
sloped.Points to the right ofFF correspond to extenal balance
with a depreciating real exchange rate, and points to the left
to an appreciating real exchange rate. ngi-un equilibrium obtains
at point A where internal and externalbalance obtain, cornbi:.ed
with aconstant real exchange rate.1 We observe that the longrr
real equilibrium inFigure 2 is independent of the rate of in-
flation. Intheshortrun, though, inflation stabilisation typically
involves a move from a point like A to B: a reduction in demand
below potential output, due to both real appreciation and increas
edreal interest rates,and a payments surplus? Bycnd therea
interest— real a.n.ec:ation feature that needs explanaLon, s:a—
We entirelyabstract from the effect of current account imbalance on asset
accumulation.Forreferences to the extensive literature on this question
see R. Dornbusch Open Economy Macroeconomics, Basic Books, 1980.
9
Thereis now anextensive literature on this question. See in particular A.
arti.renaantel "DevaluacionInflaciori Y Desempleo" Economica,Jan'ary—
August, 1968 and "The Argentina Experience with the Crawling Peg" in 3.
Williamson (ed. The Crawling Peg: Experience and_Prospects MacMillan, 1981.
Carlos Rodriguez "El Plan. Argentino de Estabilizacion del 20 de Diciembre"
CEMA, July 1979, C. Calvo "Stabilisation Rules and the Nanag Float:A
Search for Essentials" Columbia University, 1979,C. Diaz —Alejandro
"Sabilisation Policies in the Southern Cone", Yale University, 1979,issan
Liviatan 'nti—Inflationary Monetary Policy and the Capital Import Tax."
Hebrew University, 1979, D. Nathieson "Financial Reform and Capital Flows
in a Developing Country" IffStaff_Papers, N93, 1979and Krugman, P.
"Speculation and Inflation with a Crawling Peg." MIT, 1979.r F
bi1s&tion 1icies have typicl1y enccntered three specific
dif ulties;
Thevelocity problem: In the transition to a perrranent
redctionin the rate of inflation the demand for real
halnc r:es. If the price level is not instantanecs-
ly flexible, this required gain in real balarces st
be borne in mind in designing stabilisation rules. In
tar:icular,a fied rricreygrowthrate rule IITposes Un-
necsary costs in terms of output lost.1
Thispr±la.is well-friliar frnn Oiicaqo prelins. For a recentdis—
cussion see.Sirronseri"PationaJ. Exoectations and InflationStabilisation"
FundçaoGet;lio Vargas, 1980 and M.Kkian and M.Knight,"Stabilisatiori Programs







F-TCPI:2ii. The real appreciation problem: In the early stages of a
stabilisation program real appreciation is often weicorr.-
ed es supporting directly the disinflation effort
thcuqht a "cooling" of the hcsre inflation process.
is nelected is the fact that across steady states
the ecuilibrium real exchange rate remains unchanged.
Any shortterm gain through real appreciation is only' bor-
rowed and iiustbe repaid later when the realeXthry
rate dereciates.
iii. The stubborn inflation problem:Because of a lack of
credibility,because of longterrn contracts, and/or bo
cause of real wage resistance ,the inflation process is
st.:bborn. The erice level is nc:instantareos1v
fle::ibie,nor is even the rate ofinflation.
Thereisa wide variety of policy mixes that can
beused to stabilize inflation. Pássibiljtiesrange from fully
fletblenomonal exchange rates with a constant money growth rate
rule to a constant real interest rate with a managed real exchange
rate, an ince:mediate case being a constant real exohanoc rate
combined witn constant moneygrowth. e limit our analysis to
onlya few reimes, trying to highlight the interaction of the
inflationprocess and the oolicy rules.
2.AMonetary Rule andaConstant_RealExchangeRate
In this section we assume that the governmrnt sets
a fixed growth rate of nominal money, andthat the exchange
Beal appreciation is ofcourse being used in the U.K. stabilisation effort.
See the dliscassi:n in House of Ccoijflg,EflouiL2netsrvpo1,H.M.S.
Stationary Cffic,July 1980.rate is pegged along purchasing power parity lines so that
oré =0.These assumptions describe the policy regime. We further
need to specify the inflation process.As our first example e
take an inflation process that highlights the sluggishness with
which expectations of trend inflation adjust to actual chrs
in monetary growth. Specifically, we assume that inflation is
determined by exchange depreciation, expected trend inflation,
z, and the output gap:
(6) p =e+(1—r)z +cy
where z is anticipated trend inflation that is formed adaptively
on the basis of observed money growth:
(7) =(rn—z)
The model, of course, implies that a sustained reduction in
monetary growth will ultimately be reflected in lower actual and
trend inflation.
Our assumption about the exchange rate rule, =
impliesthat inflation just depends on trend inflation and the
gap.
(6)' =z+
Fromthe definition of the real interest rate i-b,andequations
(3) ,(4)and (6)' it is readily shown that output is an increas-
ing function of real balances and trend inflation while the realinterest rate is a decreasing function of these variables, as is
the balance of payments:
(8) y=y(x,z) r=r(x,z) B=B(x,z;8)
In Figure 3 we show the schedule II along which output is at the
fullemployment level and the external, balance is in equilibrium,
given the purchasing power parity exchange rate rule. The schedule
is negatively sloped since an increase in real balances lowers
real interest rates thus raising output and deteriorating the
balance of payments. To restore balance a reduction in expected
inflation is required.
Figure 3 also shows the schedule =0defined by
equation (9).
(9) ih -=- ----y(x,z)
The position of the schedule is explained as follows: If actual
money growth falls short of trend inflationreal balances are
falling unless a sufficently low level of activity helps darrpen
the inflation rate. The arrows in Figure 3 define the adjustment
of real balances and trend inflation, the latter being determin-
edby (7).
Suppose now that the authorities permanently reduce
money growth from an initial level at point A to the lower rate,
i'i, indicated by the line through point A'. How will employment,
inflation and the balance of payments respond to the stabilisa—
tion ? When money growth is first reduced, there is no impacteffect at all. Real balances start declining, as money grc:th
now falls short of trend inflation expectationand thus of
actual inflation. Only as real balances actually have declin-
ed,do we start having an effect. The real interest rate is
rising and hence output starts falling. Together with the fall
in output, which improves the current account,the rise in real
interest rates improves the capital account. There is accord-
ingly a balance of payments improvement or net reserve inflows.
Inflation is decelerating.
As trend inflation is revised in the light of
actualmoney growth ,this, in combination with the inflation
dampering of the recession, helps stop the decline in real
balances. From here on,actual inflation further declines, and
real balances grow.
The inflation trend is being revised downward in
the light of actual money growth. The output gap dnpens in-
flation and the combination of the two effects tends to lower
inflation to the level of money growth. seal balancesat first
attair. a poir.t of constancy and then start rising. Only after
real balances start rising, at a point like c,do real interest
rates stop increasing and then start falling. The turningpointsfor
output and the balance of payments thus occur after point F,
the turning point for real balances. The turning point for in
flation and depreciation, finally, follows that of output and
real income. -These relations are shown in Figure 4.
The exercice shows some ofthe principal lessons
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tio.will involve transitory unemployment. Second that in tr;e
adjstrrientprocess real interest rates rise,which in corrir.a-
tion with the decline in output, leads to a balance of payments
surrlus. Third, that in the transition, inflation and deprecia-
tion decline below the new rate of monetary expansion so as to
raise real balance and accommodate the change in desired velocity.
3. AnAlternativeInflation Model
The preceding analysis captured the stickiness cf
inflation bytheassumption of a slowly adjustingexpectation
of trend inflation. An alternative assumption is that inflation
is what it was, except for the accelerating effectsofreal
depreciation or overemployrrent:
(10) p =\(—) +
Inthis formulation, compatible for examplewith
indexation, real depreciation exerts upward pressure on infla-
tion because it raises input costs and cuts real wages. Conversely,
real appreciation exerts a dampening influence oninflation.
Donestic cyclical considerations affect inflation in that un-
employment leads to a deceleration of inflation while overemplo
ment promotes an acceleration. What is special about this formula-
tion of inflation is that only a period of sustainedunemploy-
rnent or real appreciation will achieve a reduction in inflation.
4. Managed Nominal Exchange Rates and Real Interest Rates
The next exercise considers the inflation nodel in2C.
(10)and a policy regime where the nczTiinal exchange rate is cieco1:r•-
ingaccording to a pre—set table .Thereal rate of interest ar
hencenominal money growth, are managed so as to maintain balance
of payments equilibrium. The model is difficult to present, b.t
it is sufficently important as a policy setting do deserve spell
ingout.
The exchange rate rule is specified in (11) as a
rate of deceleration of the depreciation rate proportional to the
discrepancy from the longrun target, e':
(11)
Balance ofpayments equilibrium, from (5)' and (3)specifies e
real interest rate as a function of the level and rate of char.e
of the real exchange rate.1
(12) r =- a,B>0
1Frnr ba1nce of pamnts eJlibrium in (5') we tain an eation for tE
real interest rate: r=i— -((f--ga)8 -hG)/(h+gb) where (f—ga) is assed
positive. ,thus giving us (12). We can also translate the real interest race
recui.red for external balance into a real balance requirrient by solving for
the real interest rate fran(3) and(4)toobtain: j—=(ca0--dx)/(l+bc) and,
equating theioreal interest rate expressions to ensure gocxis and rrcney
irarket equilibrium as well as paiients balance, wesolvefor real balances:
x =x(8 ,ê,). Thereal rrney stck required for external balance will be an
increasing function of the real exchange rate arid a declining function of
the rate of real depreciation and the rate of inflation.Figure 5 illustrates the stabilisation process in
this model. We show the internal balance schedule II and the
external balance FF, corresponding to a constant real exchange
rate. We also show the schedule j=O. The schedule lies in be-
tween the FF and II schedule —tomaintain inflation constant
real depreciation (to the rigñt of FF) must be offsetby urA-
employment. whether the schedule is positively or negatively
sloped depends on the relative effects of depreciation aridemploy-
ment on the acceleration of inflation. The case shown in Figure








IThe arrows in Figure 5 indicate the adjust:rt
riath under a policy that implements a deceleration of inflation
starting from full equilibrium at point A. We note that as the
policy is first set up,inflation does not, as yet, respond.
Thenominal exchange depreciationstarts declining, thereby
causingthe real exchange rate to start appreciating. Thetendency
for thereal exchange rate to start appreciating in turn reGuires
oli' makersto offset the balance of payments improvement by
loweringthe nominal and real interest rates.The first
effectthen is an appreciating real exchange rate and a declin-
ing real interest rate. In terms of Figure 5itis apparent
that the initial real appreciation and real interest decline iray
be such that output rises and inflation accelerates. This need
not, however, be the case.
The subsequent path of the real interest rate and
the real exchange rate involve continuing real appreciation, as
inflation deceleration lags on the decelerationofexchange
depreciation. But now the worsening of the currentaccount
requires a rising real interest rate. After the path crosses
the FF schedule the real exchange depreciationstartsbeing
undone. Inflation deceleration continues,supported by the high
level of unemployment, but gradually peters out. The real
depreciation now improves the current account and thus allows
real interest rates to be lowered.
The stabilisation problem differs here fran
the preceding analysis in three respects: First,
there is throughout balance of payments equilibrium. Second,23.
becausemonetary policy maintains payment equilibrium it s
possible that inflation in the first instance accelerates. Third,
in the transition process the real rate first appreciates and
then deDreciates. It is inrtanttoregnize that the cumulative
change in the real exchange rate is zero and that, accordingly,
by (10) the cumulative disinflation isentirely due to an output
level that is on average below potential
5. Fixed Real Interest Rates and Manajed RealExchan2e_Rates
Thelastapplication of our modellooks at the
case of a pegged real rate of interest,rr, combined with an
activereal exchange rate management. The real rate of exchange
is manaced so as to reduce inflation. The particular rule for
the exc:range rate is to depreciate at the rate of inflation,but
with an adjustment for the discrepancy between actual inflation
and target inflation,'
(13) =- k(-')or 0 =-kp
where we have assumed that the target rate p'O.According to
(13), the nominal and real exchange rate is actively managed to
achieve disinflation.
Combining the exchange rate policy with the infla
tion model in (10) and the output equation in (3) yields an equa
tion for acceleration of inflation:
(14) =-'k1 +p(ae-b)
whereis the given. real rate of interest.24.
InFigure 6 we show the schedule =O along which
inflation is constant. A real depreciation, by raising Output,
leads to an acceleration of inflation. To maintain inflation
thelevelof the inflation rate must be higher so as to induce
a more vigorous real appreciation rate. Points to the left of
p=O correspond to decelerating inflation.
We also havein Figure 6 theschedule II that shows
the real exchange rate at which fullemploymentprevails (given
thereal interest rate) .Theschedule FF, finally, shows the
combination of inflation rates and real exchangerates that
ensure balance of payments equilibrium. Higher inflation, via
the exchnge rate policy ,implies a more rapid rate ofreal
appreciation and therefore a higher return on domestic assets.
To maintain payments balance the favorablecapital account
must be offset by a current account deterioration through a real
appreciation) Points to the left of FF correspond to apay-
ments deficit and points to the right to a surplus.
Suppose now that the stabilisationprogram is
implemented from an initial position at point A where there is
overemployrnent (following a demand expansion) and the inflation
rate is .Theexcessive rate of inflation leads the government
to start appreciating therealexchange rate, by depreciating
the nominal rate below the prevailing rate of inflation. The ba-
lance of payments immediately shows a surplus as the real reti.in
onhome securities,comparedto foreign securites,re, rises.
Conbining (13) and (5') , andsetting the ba1are of payments equal
zero yields:= — ((f—ga) (f—ga) is assumed positive.25
Overtire,asthe real appreciation gradually
builds upi the decliningcompetitiveness starts reducing output,
while the current accountdeterioration begins to reduce the
payments surplus. Entering intoregion II,output has fallen be
low potentiai,as aconsequence of real appreciation. Now the
external balance approachesequilibrju, but the policy of real
appreciation continues becauseinflation, while declining,stjll
remains excessive.In passing to region iiiwe arrive in the
policy maker's trouble zone.Output has fallensubstantially
below normal through deliberate appreciation. TheCurrent account
has deteriorated and is no longer offsetanymore by capital inflows
Inflation has declined a lot, although it has notyet reached the







I Fan uncioir of the real appreciation. Withunemnloyrrent now
dampenir:cthe inflationaryimpact of the real deprciation
the real exchange rate reverts to itsequilibriijm value. Of
course, to make this possible, inflation must fallbelow the
targetlevel. The early disinflationary effectsof real apj:'rc--
ciation are thusrepaid in regions IVand V.
Again, as in theearlier examples, nemplovment
is the chane1 through whichdisinflation is achieved. What
is special here is the balanceof payments and real exc:-;ance
ratecycle. Themodel hiahligbtsthe stabilisation problem in
regionIII and IV whereunemplovrrent and a deficit make it
hard to believethat real appreciation is theappropriate policy. :tis important to recognize thatan attempt to return to A'
throughrapid real depreciation or a devaluatior,might cause a
sharp acceleration of inflation. At thesame time such a move
would lead to dramaticcapital outflcs (The FF schedule would
shift tothe right)as the publicrecognizes the possibility of
arge capital losses on home assets. Thispoint emphasizes the
link between the capitalaccount and actual and prospective
p:licy
III .CONCLUDINGREMARKS
Thispaper has analyzed inflationstabilisation
policy bystud\'ing a number of alternativepolicy mixes. We
startedoff with the recognition that
the important issuein
:rne discussion here alludes to the "peso problem" —thepossibility of a
change in rules which is taken into account in speculators calculation of
the prospective return. See S. Salant and D. 1-lenderson "MarketAnticipa — tionof Government Policies and the Prices of Gold" Journalof Political
Economy,4, 1978 W. Krasker "The peso problem in Testing the Efficency of
Forward Exchange Markets." Journal of Monetary Economics,April1980 and
3.S.Lizondo "Precios a FuturodeDivisas bajo Taxas de Cambio Fijasy
corn Expectativas de Devaluation" Unpublished Manuscript, ITAN, Mexico,March
1980.27.
stabilizinc inflation is not only the inevitable fiscalsar.a—
tion, but more particularly the macroeconomic dynamics. With in
flation stubborn or with inflation inertia, be itbecause of
contracts, relative wages, real resistance or credibility,reduc-
ing infThior.involvesinevtablaprotractedrecc or.
The fact that inflation stabilisation pcses inevitably
the need for a protracted recession raises issues. The
firstishow to avoid any excess cost that arises from the
velocity problem or from an overappreciation of the real ex-
change rate. This suggests that a purchasing power parity ex-
change rate policy might be preferable ,although it may imply a
slower process of disinflation.The velocity problem, inturn
suggeststhat anythingjnthe nature of a constant moneygrowth
rule is particularly undesirable.
Thechief concern, ofcourse, remains the proposi
tion that inflation stabilisation involves i.avitably a protract
ed recession. All the evidence suggestthat there isnot
sufficient inflation flexibility to all for a collapse of prevail
inginflation rates simply becausemoney growth has fallen. Ee-
cause the costs of a protracted recession are vast compared to
the allocational costs of policy activism ,one cannot but return
to the suggestion that an effective stabilisation program,along
with fiscal sanitation and some contraction of demandshouldin-
clude wage controls and real interest rate ceilincs.1
1
Real interest rate ceiling are required to avoid theinflationary effects
of tightmoney: See D. Cavallo "Stagflationary Effects of Monetarist Sta
bilization policies in Economies with Persistent Inflation." inJ. Flanders
and A. Fazin Inflation in Developing CountriesAcademicPress, 1980.2DIX
Insection II;2 we cscuss the turning points of real bal&rices, real interest
ratis and the rate of cepreciation. Thediscussionisbased on the follcwing
eations:Frcgri th definition of the real interest rate,i—, the interest rate
equation (4) ,the iricar equation (3)andthe inflation equation (6') we have:
r (vaO —dx—z)/(l±bv) v=(c—o/(n))> Oby assurnptibn
Differentiating A—i with respect to tire,and using (7) and (9)yields:
A-2 =— ( dx
Encex—zisnegative the real interest tate is still rising at the point x,
attaining its rraximir level only after real balances have started already rising.
Peal incone and the balance of payrrents ,given the real exchangerate, share the
turning points of the real interest rate. The inflation and depreciation rate,f rat,
(6)' has the follcing acceleration:
+ yc/(l—i) =(ir-z)bor/(l-)
:cjiusijig-2 to st±stitu-e forwe have:
=+ bd+ ;b=b/(l+bv)
=
Thus inflation initially decelerates.cataring A-2 and A—4,wheri the real rate
is constant inflation is still decelerating. Only after the real rate starts
falling,so that the term in brackets becares positive, and sufficentlyso, cices
inflation stop decelerating and turn around toiard the target level.
In section 11.4 we introduce the =0 schedule.FrarL the balance of payiTerts equation
we can solve forarid substituting frnn the goods irarket uation in (3) yields the
slope of the schedule:
A—5 dr/d (f—ga) + ah.i)/(v(gb+h)- ibh
the slope is positive as ass.cred if (vg—.ih ).0
Differentiating(12) ,using (10) and (11) we obtain the evolution of the real interest
rate:
A—6 1= —(c+).
—cqiy d/de' = cik
Atthe initial equilibrium,with y=O and Gat pointA,the real interestrateis
beinglcered.Then,as unerrloymentdevelopsand real appreciation proceeds, interest
ratesstartbeingraised.